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THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT IN THE GLOBAL
WAR ON TERROR: INTERNATIONAL LAWYERS
FIGHTING THE LAST WAR
GLENN M. SULMASY*
The old maxim of military strategy, "be aware of fighting the
last war,"' is especially apropos when nations confront the inter-
national security threats posed by the Global War on Terror
("GWOT"). Strategies have changed, tactics have changed, and
even our notions of what constitutes warfare have changed. The
events of 9/11 have even altered what we mean by "targeting the
enemy." Strategists and tacticians have become especially mind-
ful of the changed environment in which they operate.2 How-
ever, the theory of jus in bello3 has failed to adapt to these new
circumstances. What follows is a brief overview concerning the
need for international law to adapt to this changed environment.
First, I will give some necessary background regarding the new
geopolitical landscape. Second, I will address the important
question of whether we really are "at war." Third, I will describe
the traditional principles of the law of armed conflict. Based on
these considerations, a proposal for a new law of armed conflict
* Associate Professor of Law, United States Coast Guard Academy
(USCGA). The author is an active duty Coast Guard Commander, a judge
advocate, and a member of the USCGA permanent faculty, where he teaches
International Law, Constitutional Law, and Criminal Law. The thoughts
presented in this essay are his own and should not to be construed as the policy
of the U.S. government, the U.S. Coast Guard, or the U.S. Coast Guard
Academy.
1. It is a common maxim that generals are always fighting the last war. See
Bob Edwards Interview of General Mike Turner, USA (Ret.), Commentary: Possi-
ble Worst Case Scenarios if War in Iraq Occurs (NPR radio broadcast, Mar. 11, 2003)
(audio recording available at http://www.npr.org/programs/morning/tran-
scripts/2003/mar/0303l1 .turner.html).
2. One need look no further than the recent tragic events in Russia by
Chechen rebels. See, e.g., Peter Baker & Susan B. Glasser, Hundreds Held Hostage
at School in Russia: Many Children Seized In Town Near Chechnya, WASH. POST, Sept.
2, 2004, at Al. Such attacks, by otherwise apparently lawful combatants, further
complicate an already ambiguous legal regime.
3. The term jus in bello refers to the laws of war applied during actual
armed conflict. Its sister term is jus ad bellum, referring to the rules governing
the resort to armed conflict. Together, they make up the Law of Armed Con-
flict, or the laws of war.
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specifically designed to meet the challenges of twenty-first cen-
tury warfare is outlined.
I. BACKGROUND
The United States, and more particularly the Bush adminis-
tration, has been at the forefront of re-organizing to meet the
threat. In fact, the government merged twenty-two agencies and
175,000 workers to better attack the enemy.4 The Bush Doctrine,
calling for a proactive military/strike force and homeland secur-
ity regime (against nations posing a threat or posturing to act
against the United States in order to prevent acts like 9/11), can
be called formal foreign policy recognition of this changed world
situation. Security threats are no longer from nation-states
alone, but increasingly from rogue, international criminals oper-
ating across the borders of nation-states.5 The articulated need
for such changes is further evident in Congress's enactment of
the USA PATRIOT Act in the fall of 2001.6 Counter-terrorism
became a priority of our national security and the term "home-
land security" is now part of the American vernacular. In fact,
the U.S. Congress recently passed landmark legislation imple-
menting many of the 9/11 Commission's recommendations to
reorganize the intelligence community. 7 Many scholars and gov-
ernment officials argue that further changes are necessary to
meet the new world order and imminent threats such as those
posed by al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations.8 It seems
that all three branches of the American government-executive,
legislative, and judicial-have been forced to make adjustments
(some more radical than others) in order for the nation as a
whole to modify its strategies, plans, policies, and tactics in order
to counter international terror. Ironically, one group that has
not made such adjustments has been international lawyers. In
the light of current events, their reluctance to explore modifica-
tion of the opiniojuris, seek changes to existing international law,
or consider the need for new international norms is startling.
Failure to engage these questions will have a profoundly negative
4. See Homeland SecurityAct of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135.
5. See generally THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES
(2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf (on file with the
Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
6. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of
2001, Pub L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
7. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L.
No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638.
8. SeeJohn Yoo, Using Force, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 729 (2004).
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impact upon the international community in the foreseeable
future.
The Law of Armed Conflict ("LOAC"), by its definition, gov-
erns the law of war between two or more nation-states.9 Presently,
nation-states must be involved for LOAC to govern the warfare
activities between groups. This narrow definition is ill-suited to
the current realities. However, it is frequently non-aligned inter-
national actors, rather than traditional nation-states, that are con-
ducting warfare. International terrorism does not fit comfortably
into any existing law of armed conflict analysis. Global terrorism
has produced a new kind of "warrior." There are multiple unan-
swered questions about the legal status of international terrorists;
for example, "Do the Geneva Conventions apply to them as pris-
oners of war?" These unanticipated ambiguities due to inade-
quate definitions and accepted norms create problems for the
Bush administration, both domestically and abroad. Many in the
international community seek to afford the full protection of the
Geneva Conventions to these unlawful combatants, while others
seek to strip them of any of the protections of the laws of war. It
is time to acknowledge that al Qaeda and like minded terrorists
have ushered in a new type of warfare. Without significant
change in the law of armed conflict and consensus in interna-
tional law regarding the status of the al Qaeda warriors, these
ongoing ambiguities will hurt American interests abroad and
hamper the prosecution of the Global War on Terror. Modifica-
tion is needed, and needed immediately, or the U.S. position will
continue to be criticized at home and abroad.
The Bush administration has declared the actions against al
Qaeda a "war."'10 In so designating the conflict a "war," many
have asserted combatants involved in the conflict should be
afforded the protections of the Geneva Conventions. The
administration has continued to call it a war, but has declared on
numerous occasions that the combatants are unlawful." This
apparent contradiction confounds some and seems politically
expedient to others. Regardless, it erodes international support
for both the GWOT and other U.S. interests around the world.
Simply put, if we are at war, then we need to have some way of
9. See generally 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: DISPUTES, WAR &
NEUTRALITY § 254, at 574 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952).
10. President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address Uan 29, 2002),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 20 0 2/O1 /20020129-
1l.html (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
11. Kelly Wallace & Andrea Koppel, Bush Advisors Debate Detainees Status,
CNN, Jan. 26, 2002, at http://edition.cnn.com/2002/US/O1/ 26 /ret.powell.
detainees (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
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regulating the activities of the "warriors" involved. Accordingly,
the first issue that must be reviewed is whether we are actually at
war.
II. A WAR?
The President, the Congress, and the United Nations all
authorized the use of force in self-defense after the attacks of 9/
11.12 Al Qaeda, on myriad occasions since 1995, has "declared
war" on the United States. The level of attack inflicted on New
York City, the Pentagon, and Pennsylvania were construed by
most, if not all, as an armed attack.'" The anti-terrorist tactics
employed during the previous two decades, using the law
enforcement model, have manifestly failed. The Bush adminis-
tration sought a change in approach. They understood this to be
a new, asymmetric threat-one that required military interven-
tion. In this administration's judgment, a law enforcement
model would simply not suffice to meet this new threat.
Although some still argue the actions of the U.S. and its allies
against the terrorists constitute a law enforcement response,"4 it
is plainly unrealistic to describe what has transpired as anything
less than a war against international terrorists who seek to destroy
American strength abroad and Western culture throughout the
world. The GWOT is now predominantly fought on two fronts-
Afghanistan and Iraq.15 Despite widespread disagreement, the
reality is American and Coalition armed forces have been fight-
ing a new war since October 2001. Soldiers returning from com-
bat overseas have a hard time viewing their experiences as "law
enforcement."' 6 It seems inescapably true that we are at war,
albeit a new war, with new strategy, new tactics, and new policies.
12. Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115
Stat. 224 (2001) (authorizing use of force against those responsible for the
Sept. 11th terrorist attacks); S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4370 mtg.,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (2001).
13. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4370 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/
1368 (2001).
14. See Kenneth Roth, The Law of War in the War on Terror, FOREIGN
AFFAIRs, Jan.-Feb. 2004, at 2.
15. Beyond these two major fronts, the war has progressed in Indonesia,
the U.K, France, Russia, and Spain as well.
16. Forces returning from both Afghanistan and Iraq consistently discuss
the warfare they have been exposed to while deployed overseas. See Meredith
May, Tearful Easter Reunions as Troops Return Home, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 12, 2004, at
B1; see also Lynn Neary, Troop Rotation: Coming Home (NPR radio broadcast, Feb.
11, 2004) (audio recording available at http://www.npr.org/rundowns/run-
down.php?prgld=5&prgDate=l 
.Feb-2004).
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III. THE LAW
The Law of Armed Conflict ("LOAC") regulates the conduct
of armed forces when engaging one another. One might say that
it is a means of enforcing a certain level of humanity within an
arena that is inherently inhumane. The LOAC affords some
level of duty and responsibility to the warrior. In addition, it
offers legal protections to the warrior. However, the LOAC has
simply not adapted sufficiently to this new threat and new form
of warfare.
The LOAC assumes that, while it is nations that wage war,
individuals and citizens make up the fighting force and should
be accorded certain norms of humane treatment. Confronted
with this new type of warfare, most international lawyers have
hastily concluded either that the LOAC does not apply to the
GWOT or that the protections of LOAC should be afforded to all
involved. Both positions have some positive and negative aspects.
Unfortunately, neither satisfies the current needs of
policymakers.
Both positions are shortsighted. They fail to take account of
the realities now confronting the civilized world. On the one
hand, if we accord the existing LOAC protections to the al
Qaeda warriors, many assert such protection tends to legitimize
international terror as a means of warfare. 7 This would equate
those warriors who fight for nation-states as soldiers, sailors,
marines, or coastguardsmen with terrorist agents who do not
wear any indicia of being soldiers,i" who do not represent any
particular nation, and who have made the killing of innocent
non-combatant civilians the central tactic of their plan of war. In
addition, if the LOAC were to apply, then the nineteen hijackers
and those who helped plan and coordinate the attacks would be
entitled (if captured) to Prisoner of War ("POW") status. This
seems, at best, inappropriate. Besides, as it has been traditionally
understood, the LOAC requires the involvement of two or more
nation-states in the conflict in order for its rules to apply. Thus,
on several levels, this analysis does not seem adequate to regulate
the current security threats.
However, if we do not apply the LOAC at all, then we prose-
cute what we call a "war" using law enforcement techniques.
This too seems illogical and inadequate to meet the exigencies of
the present situation. Armed forces fighting the GWOT would
17. See Kenneth Watkin, Controlling the Use of Force: A Role for Human Rights
Norms in Contemporay Armed Conflict, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (2004).
18. See W. Hays Parks, Special Forces' Wear of Non-Standard Uniforms, 4 CHI.
J. INT'L L. 493 (2003).
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have to alter intelligence collection practices, use civilian evi-
dence custody procedures, and execute the mission in exactly
the opposite manner of the military practices for which they were
trained. Also, armed forces officers could potentially be vulnera-
ble to tort litigation, negligence lawsuits, and other liability, as
are law enforcement officials. Clearly, the warriors are uncom-
fortable being police officers. The results from using the law
enforcement model for over two decades permitted the condi-
tions wherein al Qaeda could plan, arrange, and stage the hor-
rendous attack that was carried out on 9/11.9 Thus, concluding
that the LOAC does not apply to global terrorists seems just as
inadequate a response to the needs of our nation and world as
saying that the LOAC does apply.
IV. A NEW LAw OF ARMED CONFLICT
The nature of warfare has changed. International lawyers
must not cling to the definitions of the past if history has ren-
dered them obsolete. The law must be flexible enough to evolve
with the new issues confronting the family of nations. Clearly,
the existing customary law and the Geneva Conventions did not
anticipate the new world (dis)order. International terrorism,
whether we want to accept it or not, is the security threat of the
twenty-first century. It will remain as such for the foreseeable
future. Seeking to use the old norms and customs of how war is
fought will result in erosion of the will to fight the enemy. A
new, modified law of armed conflict against international terror-
ism ("LOAC IT") needs to be developed in order to regulate the
conduct of coalition forces and the treatment of captured inter-
national terrorists. This new form of warfare must have a new
means of regulating conduct between forces. Nation-states are
no longer the only entities with the ability to wage war. Such
notions are relics of the period from Grotius's writings in the
seventeenth century to the Cold War of the twentieth century.
Non-governmental political organizations, terrorist organiza-
tions, and various interest groups all have the capacity to wage(and are waging) war against nation-states. Lawyers must create
an adequate code to meet the new threats. In doing so, they can-
not and should not, obviate the Geneva Conventions and the
laws of war as conducted between lawful combatants of recog-
nized nation-states. Thus, the LOAC IT will offer a middle
ground to regulate the activity of this warfare without necessarily
19. See generally NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S.,
THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT (2004).
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creating the appearance of equating tactics of international 
ter-
rorists with those of established armed forces.
While the exact details will require very careful analysis 
and
discussion, at a minimum, the following list provides some 
of the
necessary features of a new LOAC IT:
1. Geneva Conventions would still apply to those serving 
in
combat operations, openly displaying their uniform 
and
nation, and otherwise observing the laws of war;
2. Limited protections must be afforded to non-military
enemy combatants, including the right to a military
commission, the opportunity to pray and observe their
faith, access to a detailed military defense counsel while
imprisoned, access to adequate military facilities, 
and
quarters that are habitable;
3. Torture must be strictly forbidden; however, interroga-
tion should be permissible. Interrogations should be in
accord with customary international law and applicable
Torture Conventions;
4. Neutral nations, persons, and property shall be forbid-
den from capture;
5. Use of protected places, such as temples, churches, hos-
pitals, mosques and other areas generally recognized 
as
protected, must be exempt from attack. If used as haven
or occupied through perfidy, as in some means support-
ing the war effort, such actions shall be prohibited and
violators shall be tried by military commissions;
6. The use of chemical weapons must be prohibited 
and in
accord with the Chemical Weapons Convention;
7. The principles of necessity, proportionality, and distinc-
tion would apply to all activities.
CONCLUSION
In essence, aware that international terrorists will, as 
a mat-
ter of policy and tactics, violate the existing LOAC with regard 
to
the jus in bello as well as the jus ad bellum, we must adapt interna-
tional law to afford some elements of conventional protections 
to
those who fight wars in this fashion. The existing 
status for
"enemy combatants" and international terrorists has left the West
open to criticism from both the new Europe and throughout 
the
Muslim world. Cognizant that the threat will remain for 
some
time and conscious this will be the form of war of the 
twenty-first
century, adapting and changing our paradigms for treatment 
of
prisoners in the Global War on Terror will help to resolve 
many
of the ambiguities we now face. An international commission
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will be necessary in order to formulate a new code for this new
form of warfare. This Commission should be tasked with creat-
ing a new Law of Armed Conflict for International Terrorists.
Strategy, organization, and policies around the world have
adapted to meet the new threat of international terror. It is now
critical for international lawyers to accept and adapt to the new
wars of the twenty-first century and not remain trapped in the
laws of the past.
